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A Long-Standing Debate: Reflections on Risk 
and Anxiety: A Theory of Data Breach Harms 
by Daniel Solove and Danielle Keats Citron 
Ryan Calo* 
I jumped at the opportunity to respond to Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of 
Data Breach Harms1 by two of the leading lights of privacy law. I find I am 
hard-pressed to name two scholars who have had a greater influence on the 
arc of contemporary privacy law than Daniel Solove and Danielle Keats 
Citron. Professor Solove co-founded (with Chris Hoofnagle) the flagship 
privacy law conference2 and is the author of many of the field’s foundational 
texts.3 Like Beatles albums in the 1960s, each new Professor Citron paper 
seems to anticipate and channel the direction of the discipline.4 Both scholars 
help set the collegial and supportive tone that surprises and delights new 
entrants to the field. 
This jointly-authored Article contributes mightily to our understanding 
of a critical aspect of privacy: harm. As Professors Solove and Citron 
carefully evidence, courts are reticent to countenance the harms that flow 
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School of Law. The author would like to thank the Texas Law Review for the opportunity to 
comment on this Article and Maya Swanes for excellent research assistance. 
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from a violation of privacy, even as they compensate similar harms in other 
contexts.5 Thus while exposing a plaintiff to an environmental or health risk 
may be compensable, few decisions vindicate victims of a data breach unless 
or until they experience actual identity theft.6 Courts have recognized 
subjective harms such as fear since the night W de S threw his fateful axe at 
M de S.7 But courts seldom recognize harm in anxieties over data exposure 
so significant that they have contributed to suicide.8 
Such privacy harm exceptionalism is pervasive and problematic.9 Yet 
Professors Solove and Citron’s account is in a sense hopeful: perhaps courts 
are reticent to countenance privacy harms for traditional reasons such as the 
lack of a limiting principle or the concern over plaintiff fraud. The central 
contribution of the Article resides in its deep excavation of the “ample 
conceptual foundations” for recognizing risk and anxiety as concrete harms 
in the context of privacy and in the rigorous framework it offers courts to 
assess these harms.10 
While not quite as specific as, for instance, Lior Strahilevitz’s 
invocation of social network theory to calibrate reputational harms,11 the 
Solove–Citron approach equips courts with far better tools by which to 
identify, calibrate, and address privacy harms resulting from a data breach. I 
have little doubt that courts will look to this Article as they navigate data 
breach litigation, an area of jurisprudence that only grows in impact and 
importance year by year. 
Despite my widespread agreement with Risk and Anxiety, I suspect the 
analysis is missing a step. Presumably Congress can create a protectable 
interest—including a privacy interest—where none existed before.12 The 
question is whether Congress, with enough specificity of intent, could create 
a right to be free from privacy risk or anxiety or whether the very nature of 
these injuries somehow offends Article III.13 In this way, privacy harm turns 
out to be an interesting testing ground for a longstanding debate about the 
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limits of legislatively conferred standing.14 And solving the puzzle of privacy 
harm arguably requires addressing this debate directly. 
Privacy exceptionalism is pervasive; it is not universal. Consider the 
experiences of many plaintiffs with the Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction 
Act (FACTA).15 As of 2006, FACTA requires all businesses to truncate a 
consumer’s credit card number on any electronically printed receipt precisely 
to avoid the risk of identity theft.16 FACTA has a private cause of action and 
provides for statutory damages of up to $1,000 per violation.17 For years, 
plaintiffs’ lawyers made a lucrative practice of suing businesses that failed to 
comply with FACTA. A good deal of these lawsuits succeeded without 
regard to whether the unmasked credit card number actually caused a 
monetary harm.18 That is why you almost never see a non-complaint receipt 
anymore. These courts did not wring their hands over risk or anxiety because 
the law instructed them not to. 
Not all FACTA cases went forward.19 And plaintiffs have fared far 
worse in other contexts. Compare the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
Privacy Act of 1974.20 Federal Aviation Administration v. Cooper,21 involved 
a licensed pilot living with human immunodeficiency virus or HIV.22 The 
Social Security Administration contravened the Privacy Act by sharing 
Stanmore Cooper’s status with the Federal Aviation Administration, which 
resulted, among other things, in Cooper losing his license and employment.23 
Like FACTA, the Privacy Act furnishes victims with a private cause of 
action.24 And like FACTA, the Privacy Act guarantees minimum damages, 
providing that “the United States shall be liable to the individual in an amount 
equal to the sum of actual damages sustained by the individual as a result of 
the refusal or failure, but in no case shall a person entitled to recovery receive 
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less than the sum of $1000.”25 Congress promulgated the Privacy Act amidst 
a passionate debate over whether the mere existence of government databases 
represents an affront to citizen autonomy. The language seems clear enough 
that anyone who suffers an “adverse effect,”26 such as the destruction of their 
very livelihood, from a violation of the Act is entitled to at least $1000, but 
up to their actual damages.27 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court somehow read 
into this language the intent by Congress to require the plaintiff to show 
specific pecuniary harm and dismissed the case on this basis.28 
Why do plaintiffs succeed under FACTA but lose under the Privacy Act 
when, in both instances, the plaintiff showed a violation of a statute meant to 
safeguard their data with a private cause of action and minimum statutory 
damages? 
Maybe the answer can be found, as Professors Solove and Citron 
assume, in the failure of courts to appreciate privacy harm’s fullest scope. 
But there are other theories to rule out. Note that the Supreme Court tortured 
the language of the Privacy Act, finding Congressional intent to deny 
recovery absent evidence of actual harm in a minimum damages clause, 
rather than premise the decision entirely on standing.29 Perhaps even with 
greater care and specificity as to the nature of the protected interest, Congress 
might have bound the courts to permit compensation for a far wider range of 
injuries than literal pecuniary loss. 
Accordingly, I would be curious as to what guidance Professors Solove 
and Citron might offer lawmakers. What language could a lawmaker, 
inclined to address privacy harm exceptionalism head on through the political 
process, employ that would avoid the pitfalls of Cooper? And what lessons 
do the authors believe the context of privacy can teach us about the capacity 
of the legislatures to create a protectable interest where none existed before? 
Risk and Anxiety represents a wonderful contribution to an important 
topic. Perhaps it is a testament to the Article’s success that it leaves this reader 
wanting to hear more. I am grateful for this opportunity to comment and to 
the authors themselves for their creativity, mentoring, and grace. 
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